Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment by Moshe Lissak

Author:Moshe Lissak [Lissak, Moshe]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780714632353
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 1984-06-28T00:00:00+00:00

AN ANATOMY OF A POLITICAL-MILITARY DECISION (A SECOND EDITION) – THE WAR AGAINST SYRIA

The pattern of political-military decision making in regard to the conquest of the Golan Heights is characterized by structural elements which are basically similar to the processes on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts. The first significant political decision relevant to Syria was made on June 7, after the situation in the Sinai peninsula became clear. ‘The Cabinet, acting as the MCD, decided to advance on the Syrian front to the international border only. If, during the fighting it would seem necessary to get a foothold on the Syrian escarpment (which means an advance of 4–5 km. or about 3.5 miles) the matter would be submitted to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense for their approval.’ On 8 June, the Cabinet ‘decided to delay its previous decision’ and not to attack Syria.30

Pressed by counterforces – ‘Allon’s demand which was supported by the General Staff’ and by the citizens of the settlements near the Syrian border ‘who demanded action against the Syrians’ versus Dayan’s reluctance31 – Prime Minister Eshkol ‘agreed with Dayan’s proposal … because of concern about possible Soviet intervention’.32 The prime minister formulated his goal and ‘demanded the occupation of the headwaters of the Jordan River system’ (not farther than 3.5 miles inside the Syrian territory).33

Again, the reality was different. On Friday, 9 June, Israel moved on the Syrian front, and occupied all of the area of the Golan Heights. On one hand, ‘Syria at 01:00, New York time (07:00 a.m., Israel time) … accepted the cease fire …’ but on the other hand, early on the morning of June 9, Dayan, without obtaining the permission of Eshkol and the Cabinet and bypassing the chief of staff, directly ordered General Elazar (the commander of the northern front) to attack Syria. ‘Eshkol was furious’, the government ‘was shocked’, but the decision was made.34 Again, it was a type of partial directive. ‘No decision was taken as to where the army should stop. The Cabinet did not decide to occupy the Golan Heights; this became a function of military advance.’35

In short, Eshkol’s definite narrow goal of the headwaters of the Jordan River, Dayan’s view of a limited advance inside the Syrian territory (not far from the 1948 international border), and the retroactive approval of the government – all these goal definitions were quite different from the military’s wider operational goals and the end lines of advance. The conquest of the Golan Heights (as well as the territorial definition – that is, the Golan Heights) became once more a revised version of the process on the other fronts – an outcome of a military decision.

Although many scientific desciplines can be manipulated to explain what had really happened (e.g. the ‘psychological dimension’ in Dayan’s pattern of decision making, an analysis of styles in political behavior of leaders, etc.), I would prefer to highlight, again, the situational effects combined with the actual networks and concrete decisions.

The main latent factor in the outbreak of the Six-Day War was Syria, which has long been considered the archenemy of Israel.

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